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Sunday, May 20, 2012

Ahmed Ismail

Ahmed Ismail was an Egyptian General ordered by President Sadat to plan an attack to Israel. He was renowned for his success to build an attack plan that shock an Israeli at that time. His ability to build successful attack plan was caused by his good intelligence operation prior to its attack. This intelligence operation has deceit and mislead an Israel Defense Force so an Israeli unaware of the attack.

Monday, May 14, 2012

Cheka

On 20 December 1917, Lenin  officially established the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-revolution and Sabotage—usually known as the Cheka. The Cheka received a large amount of resources, and became known for ruthlessly pursuing any perceived counterrevolutionary elements.
Many historians categorize Cheka as terror organization. To describe Cheka, let's read the statement made by the first leader of Cheka, Dzerzhinsky. Dzerzhinsky explained in July 1918: "We stand for organized terror - this should be frankly admitted. Terror is an absolute necessity during times of revolution. Our aim is to fight against the enemies of the Soviet Government and of the new order of life. We judge quickly. In most cases only a day passes between the apprehension of the criminal and his sentence. When confronted with evidence criminals in almost every case confess; and what argument can have greater weight than a criminal's own confession."

Felix Dzerzhinsky

Felix Dzerzhinsky was among the earlier communist leaders, that lead the Bolshevik Revolution. He was the first leader of All-Russia Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-revolution and Sabotage known as Cheka.

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Operation Niagara

Operation Niagara was one of intelligence operations conducted by US Military during Vietnam War. This operation mainly conducted in Khe Sanh, an area located near the border of North Vietnam and South Vietnam. During this operation, US Military airdropped thousands of the new Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) around the base to monitor North Vietnamese activity, and intelligence analysts at highly secret sigint bases in far-off Thailand were soon receiving conversations between puzzled NVA soldiers along the lines.
Operation Niagara around Khe Sanh was a huge intelli-gence success, and by mid-January 1968 it had identified 15,000 men of the NVA 325th and 304th Divisions definitely closing in on the US base. Patrols from the US Marines began to clash with NVA regulars digging in on the surrounding hills as the communist noose tightened.

Sunday, January 1, 2012

KOPASSUS

Kopassus (Komandu Pasukan Khusus) is Indonesian army special forces that conducts special operation missions for Indonesian government. One of its mission is on intelligence mission, especially on warfare intelligence mission. It has many experiences on warfare intelligence duties, such as on East Timor conflict, Papua conflict, Aceh conflict, etc.
Many controversies to the Kopassus. One controversy is its involvement on intelligence mission targeting the oppositions of Soeharto regime. Several activists were kidnapped and lost during the Soeharto regime. Because of this, Kopassus alleged to be the entity which has violate the human rights, and accepted many critics.
Aside from human rights problems, technically Kopassus renowned for its technical capabilities. Some analysts, believe that Kopassus is the best special forces in Southeast Asia.

Monday, November 29, 2010

Z ORGANISATION

An alternative, independent intelligence-gathering network run by the Secret Intelligence Service prior to World War II in parallel to, but in isolation from, the conventional Passport Control Offices. Z personnel usually operated under commercial or journalistic cover across Europe. They were directed from offices in Bush House, on the Strand, and were attached to such businesses as Geoffrey Duveen & Co., Alexander Korda’s London Films, and a travel company. In addition, Z’s chief, Claude Dansey, succeeded in recruiting many of his personal contacts, among them some well-known foreign correspondents such as Geoffrey Cox, Frederick Voight, and Eric Gedye.
In September 1939, Z personnel were instructed to make themselves known to the local passport control officer (PCO), wherever they were, and to continue their intelligence-gathering activities in tandem. In reality many PCOs were skeptical about the quality of Z personnel and the reliability of their networks. When Capt.  Sigismund Best was abducted at Venlo in November 1939, it was assumed that whatever advantage had been achieved by the Z Organisation had been compromised permanently.

ZINOVIEV LETTER

This Comintern directive, from the chairman of the Third International, Grigori Zinoviev, and addressed to the Executive Committee of the  Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in September 1924 created a political furor in London when it was published by the Daily Mail four days before the general election because it advocated sedition on a grand scale and agitation within the armed forces.
The document had been received in London by the Secret Intelligence Service’s chief of production, Maj. (Sir) Desmond Morton, and then had been circulated routinely to the services, MI5, and the Foreign Office, although as was customary there was no indication of how or where SIS had acquired it. As a consequence, Ramsay Mac-Donald’s first Labour administration, which had already lost a vote of confidence in the House of Commons and was losing its Liberal support, was portrayed as having been willing to tolerate the Kremlin’s subversion, and Stanley Baldwin was swept into office in a landslide victory. The fact that Zinoviev protested that he had never sent any such letter, and the CPGB denied ever having received it, was dismissed as typically, predictably, duplicitous and spurious.
In 1998 an investigation was conducted by the Foreign Office’s chief historian, Gill Bennett, and her subsequent report, which drew on an earlier investigation conducted by Millicent Bagot of MI5, established the sequence of events that had followed safe receipt  of the document from the SIS station in Riga. Bennett eventually concluded that the letter itself was undoubtedly a forgery, although its composition was sufficiently skillful to persuade those who read it of its intrinsic authenticity. No blame could be attached to Ronald Meiklejohn for acquiring this tantalizing item and sending it to headquarters, and Major Morton acted quite properly by circulating it to SIS’s clients.
As for who actually peddled the original Russian document in Riga, the Soviets, who were as interested as anyone else in who had been counterfeiting Comintern directives, concluded that it was a notorious White Russian forger, Vladimir Orlov, who had been Gen. Piotr Wrangel’s chief of intelligence. Orlov had made a good living fabricating ostensibly plausible Soviet documents, mainly for propaganda purposes, and when the SIS contacted Meiklejohn to conduct investigations into his source, yet more supporting evidence conveniently materialized, including a record of the minutes of an emergency meeting of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), convened on 25 October 1924 to discuss the crisis in Great Britain and supposedly chaired by Leo Kamenev. This second document, containing admissions that the Zinoviev directive was genuine, was sent to London on 6 November and was seized on by the SIS chief Adm. Sir Hugh Sinclair as empirical proof, but this too had been forged by Orlov.
The issue of the letter’s authenticity was to be decided by a Cabinet committee, chaired by Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, who conducted a secret inquiry and issued no concluding report. Sinclair supplied a five-point memorandum to prove the case for authenticity and claimed that the source run by the Riga station worked for the Comintern secretariat in Moscow and had access to the Comintern’s secret files, whereas Meiklejohn had only ever claimed to have run an agent in Riga who was in touch with such an individual (whose identity was unknown to him). Sinclair also claimed that the letter’s content was entirely consistent with what was known to be the Comintern’s policies, but his fifth and final argument—that if the document had been a forgery, it would have been uncovered as such—seems bizarre and even desperate. Nevertheless, the committee reported to the full Cabinet on 19 November that they “were unanimously of the opinion that there was no doubt as to the authenticity of the Letter.”